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Abstract— The purpose of this paper is to develop an approach to 
analyze organizational vulnerability caused by its employees. The 
proposed approach is adapted from general attack graph analysis 
approach and social network analysis approach.  The attack 
graph, which is relationship graph in this proposed approach, is 
created from organization’s email logs and virus reports. The 
relationship graph is analyzed using shortest path analysis to 
discover all possible attack paths start from risky employees to 
target employee, and then grouped by path length for further 
actions based on security policy. The proposed approach was 
tested using datasets that are limited to only one month with 
assumption that weight on all edges are equal. This paper 
suggested further study to improve accuracy of the proposed 
approach using other mathematical methods such as shortest path 
analysis with weight or Markov Chains. The proposed approach 
could also be used by security audit in risk assessment process. 
Keywords-attack graph; social network analysis; shortest path; 
graph theory; IT policy; security policy 
I. INTRODUCTION
Cyber-attacks have been known since the 1960s with an 
objective to take control of the computer systems in an 
organization. Since then, analysts have attempted to find the way 
to determine risk from the vulnerabilities in the network and 
computer systems of an organization so they can mitigate or 
prevent them from being attacked. There are several tools and 
techniques that help analysts study the vulnerabilities. One of the 
most favorite tool is the attack graph approach which is the 
analysis based on tools and techniques developed from graph 
theory [1]–[9]. This tool helps analysts visualize all 
vulnerabilities and all possible attack paths so they can find 
patterns of attacks and improve security systems. However, the 
vulnerability of the organization is not only the computer 
network and computer systems, but also the people in the 
organization. The current attack graph approach has yet focused 
on the vulnerabilities caused by employees. 
Attackers today are now using social engineering as a major 
attack to an organization because it attacks the people within the 
organization directly. Some employees in an organization have 
bad behaviors when using computers or IT systems which create 
vulnerabilities. For example, they click on a URL or double click 
on an attached file which was emailed from an unknown sender. 
Attackers exploit vulnerability of an employee to take control 
over his/her computer and try to get to other employees in the 
organization. It keeps going until the attacker gets to the target 
employee to collect critical information of the organization and 
takes control of the whole computer systems. If we know who 
causes or can be exploited in social engineering attacks, it should 
be possible find the way to prevent them on the first hand. We 
can say that an organization must improve their protection 
technology together with eliminating risk behaviors of 
employees in its organization. Since different behaviors create 
different security issues, organization should also be able to take 
specific actions for specific issue as well [10]. 
The problem is that, not like network and computer system 
vulnerability analysis, there is no structural approach to 
determine risk of an organization from vulnerability of people or 
employees. Since the vulnerability of people are caused by bad 
behaviors when using IT systems, an analysis of human 
behaviors is required. However, such analysis has been taken in 
sociology.  
Similar to security of network analysis, Social Network 
Analysis (SNA) utilizes graph theory in the study too. The main 
ideas of this article is to find structural approach that integrate 
SNA and Attack Graph Network Analysis to analyze 
vulnerabilities caused by people in an organization.  
II. RELATED WORKS 
Newman has categorized networks into 4 groups [11]; social 
networks, information networks, technological networks, and 
biological networks. As stated in previous section, the 
development of new approach in this article were from several 
studies in two types of networks, the social network analysis in 
social networks and attack graph analysis in information 
networks. In this section, we are giving background of works 
that lead to our study. Those works are related to the computer 
network analysis and social network analysis. 
A. Attack Graph Analysis
Attack graph is a graph-based approach that provides all
possible ways that attackers will successfully gain control over 
organization computer network. The approach is widely used in 
vulnerability analysis of computer networks [1]–[5], [12]. The 
graph in attack graph is created from the attack model that 
represents network configuration and its vulnerabilities in an 
organization. However, different works present attack graph 
differently. In Ammann’s attack graphs, vertices of the graph 
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represent state or privileges over a network component that 
attackers could obtain by exploiting vulnerability in the network 
systems, while edges represent actions to be taken to obtain each 
states. Sheyner [5], [6] use vertices to represent both states and 
specific attacks whether it is detectable or undetectable by 
intrusion detection system, while edges represent order of the 
attacks. Some may include attributes other than network 
attributes into the graph. For example, Dantu [2] and Williams 
[7] include attacker profile into each vertices on the attack
graphs.
Attack graph is analyzed using several mathematical 
methods so analysts could find which attack paths are likely to 
happen and how its risks affect an organization. Phillips [8] 
suggested that single shortest path algorithms can find the lowest 
cost attack path which is the most possible path that attacker may 
choose. Zhang [9] and Smith[13] proposed Probabilistic Risk 
Assessment (PRA) method which uses probabilistic measures to 
determine system reliability. Madan [14] uses semi-Markov 
processes (SMP) to quantify security attributes of the intrusion 
tolerant system. This method helps to describe attacker’s 
behavior and solve SMP. It also helps to calculate a security 
measure called “Mean Time to Security Failure (MTTSF)” 
which will be used to plan ahead on attacks. 
In the method proposed by Jha [3] and Sheyner [5], attack 
graphs will be interpreted via Markov Decision Processes to 
compute the probabilities of intruder success for each attack. 
Mehta [4] suggested that the ranked attack graphs calculated by 
two algorithms, PageRank and Ranking States of attack graphs, 
are valuable for a system administrator as it allows them to 
estimate the security level of the system and provide a guideline 
for choosing appropriate corrective or preventive measures.  
Williams [7] incorporate attacker’s behaviors into attack 
models and construct attack profiles. The attack profiles are 
formed with assigned rating and will be used to compare with 
user profile and identify who is the attacker base on its rates. 
This approach will improve the robustness of the collaborative 
systems. Dantu [2] also uses attacker profile to create attack 
graphs and labelling attack path with behavior attributes 
identified in the attacker profiles. Attacker profiles are used for 
calculating the trust of a given attack path using probabilistic 
estimation (Bayesian statistic). As a result, network analyst can 
create patch for network security device according to the 
analysis. 
As per the works above, all attack graphs are created from 
organization’s network configurations. Its analysis also focuses 
on computer networks vulnerability, not the vulnerability of the 
people in an organization. This paper intends to find approach to 
fill this gap. 
B. Social Network Analysis (SNA)
Similar to the computer network studies, “Social Network
Analysis”, or SNA also utilizes graph theory to generate 
mathematical model of the networks. Analysts can create graph 
to model social network which is known as “social graph” and 
analyze it. Moreno [15] used circles and lines to represent 
studied group in his work which was the first time graph was 
used in social study. Harary [16] improved SNA by using 
matrices as data structure of social graph. Since then matrices 
have become fundamental to social graph study. 
SNA is the analysis of relationships between members in a 
social network. We can use a social graph to represent social 
network for analysis. In social graph, vertices represent people 
in society and edges represent relationship between people in the 
society. Social graph can be created from several sources of 
information. Newman [11] has founded that networks of 
different sources has different properties. For example, a 
network of emails has properties of directed graph while a 
network of telephones has properties of undirected graph.  
Email has been used as source information to generate social 
graph in many researches. Newman [17] used email networks to 
study the spread of computer virus. He found that email viruses 
spread in organization network differently from human viruses 
because it was directed, unlike human network which was 
undirected. He also suggested that controlling email viruses 
problem in an organization shall use network structure to help 
identifying risk node in the network. However, his studies are on 
a few behaviors and properties of networks. There are more to 
study on the behaviors and functions of the network that will 
help analysts understand more of the real world networks. Ebel 
[18] also studied email network of Kiel University in the same
year and found that the email network was scale-free and
exhibited Milgram’s small-world effect. Scale-free network
shows some properties that have not been found in random
network. In Scale-free network, there will be some nodes that
act as hubs, while in random network, hubs are not allowed [20].
In 2003, Tyler [19] used email networks to find the structure of
community within an organization. He used betweeness
centrality to discover group of community within an
organization.
Social network graph of email and attack graph have some 
common similarities. Both graphs are directed and have some 
vertices that act like hubs. This means that we may develop 
attack model and attack graph using social network graph, and 
analyze the model and its graph to determine risk of the whole 
organization as well. This assumption will be studied and 
described in the following sections. 
C. General Attack Graph Analysis Approach
Attack graph analysis has been proposed and studied for
many years. Those studies follow similar approach to prepare 
and analyze the attack graph in those studies. In order to 
understand the approach of attack graph analysis, we have 
summarized general attack graphs analysis approach as 
illustrated in the Figure 1. 
Figure 1.  General approach of attack graph analysis 
Each step in the above approach represented by circles and 
output of each step are represented by rectangles. These steps 
are described below. 
1) Define Attack Model: In this step, analyst identify
components of the environment that will be studied and, if 
needed, form mathematical formula to represent those 
components in the model. Objectives of the study also be defined 
in this step. The output of this step is Attack Model. 
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2) Prepare Attack Graph: In this step, the network will be
visualized with graph using information gathering from the 
studied group. The graph represents logical relationship between 
components and its problems in the attack model, including with 
appropriate attributes. The output of this step is Attack Graph. 
3) Analyze the Model: The graph from previous step will be
analyzed using mathematical methods to determine that 
objectives of the analysis is met. In attack graph analysis, the 
common objectives of the analysis is to find the most probable 
attack path from the vertex of the start state to the end state of 
the attack. 
Both attack model and attack graph are defined and created 
based on security attributes of a studied computer networks. 
There are tools available for analyst to create the attack model 
and attack graph. For example, NuSMV from Carnegie Mellon 
University is the favorite tool used by many researchers such as 
Jha [3], Sheyner [5], [6] and Ammann [1], while MulVAL was 
used by Ou [21]. Mathematical model(s) will be applied into the 
graph via these tools to identify which attack path is the most 
risky for the organization. Analyst will then find proper solution 
to mitigate it beforehand. 
However, the general approach of attack graph analysis and 
its tools are not able help create attack model and attack graph 
of the studied employees network in an organization. The next 
section will explain how we adapted the general approach of 
attack graph analysis so it can help analyze attack model and 
attack graph based on employees’ network. 
III. THE PROPOSED APPROACH
The similarity between scale-free social network graph and 
attack graph mentioned in previous section leads to the 
assumption that it is possible to associate social network analysis 
with attack graph analysis to determine risk of organization from 
user aspect. By integrating general attack graph analysis 
approach in Figure 1 with social network analysis approach, an 
approach for the study of risk analysis can be proposed (See 
Figure 2).  
The approach in Figure 2 has been introduced by 
Kanchanapokin and Boonkrong [22] as an approach for further 
study of organization vulnerability using integration approach of 
attack graph and social network analysis. It has some changes 
from the methodology in Figure 1. First, the name “attack 
model” and “attack graph” have been changed to “relationship 
model” and “relationship graph”. We have changed the attack 
model to relationship model to imply the step of creating social 
network model and social network graph of the organization so 
it can be understood what and how each member of an 
organization relates to each other. Our proposed approach has 
two phases. The first phase covers steps to define relationship 
model and prepare relationship graph from available 
information in the studied organization. Employee’s risk 
properties were also added into the relationship model to 
generate a relationship graph. This can then be used to analyze 
possible risk that the organization might have taken from the risk 
of individual employee. These attributes could also be calculated 
from available information in organization such as email log and 
virus/malware log of each user node. As in this paper, we 
calculated risk attribute using antivirus report on employees’ 
computer and put into employees’ vertices generated from email 
log. 
The second phase, we find attack path using graph shortest 
path analysis. We grouped all risky employees by the length of 
their shortest path found on individual into levels so we can 
apply appropriate security policy to them. 
Below is explanation of each step. 
Figure 2.  The proposed approach[22] 
A. Defining the Relationship Model
Generally, the environment we studied was an organization
that comprised of employees who had a chance to be 
compromised by an attacker. Those employees could be grouped 
into an employee primary attack, other employees, and an 
employee who would be the final target of the attack. Figure 3 
below represents the environment of the organization we 
mentioned above. 
Figure 3.  Environment of the studied organization 
The employee primary attack represents the employee who 
has bad behavior that makes him or her vulnerable to an attack. 
An adversary could then exploit the vulnerabilities to collect 
information or gain control of his or her computer to get to next 
employees on the network. The interaction between employee 
primary attack and other employees are represented by a link 
between them. A linkage between two employees implies that 
both have interaction in some aspect. The employee target 
attack, also known as the destination of the attack, holds the most 
important information of the organization, or has authority to 
access the organization’s information systems. The model of 
employees and its relationship is shown below in Figure 4. 
Figure 4.  Relationship model 
In the Relationship Model illustrated in Figure 4, employees 
in the model are tagged with risk score Ri so they can be 
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determined who is likely to be an employee primary attack. The 
risk score is calculated from any information available for the 
organization. That means different organizations would provide 
a different risk score. The focus of this paper is on the bad 
behaviors in IT usage, such as frequently sending email with 
attached files to unauthorized email addresses [22], or the use of 
memory stick that has been infected with a virus on company 
computer. Therefore, the risk score represents employees’ bad 
behaviors for the studied organization. 
The interaction between two employees is tagged with a 
value that defines the importance of the relationship between 
them. This is known as a relationship score. This comes from the 
fact that an employee may consider interaction with some 
employee more important than another employee. Relationship 
score can be justified by the number of interactions between an 
employee and other employees next to him. For example if 
employee 1 sends an email to employee 2 more often than to 
employee 3 then the relationship score between 1 and 2 will be 
greater than the relationship score between 1 and 3. 
Let wi,j be the relationship score between employee i and j. 
If the number of interactions between employee 1 and 2 is 
greater than the number of interactions between employees 1 
and 3 then w1,2 is greater than w1,3. However, the number of 
interactions can be a lot more difference on each employee. We 
may not use the number of interaction between employees as a 
relationship score directly. Instead, we may use the ratio of 
interactions from an employee and other employees next to him. 
Let wi,j be the relationship score from employee i to j and 
there are m employees next to employee i. If fi,j, fi,j+1, fi,j+2, … fi,m 
be the number of interactions from employee i to j, j+1, j+2, …, 







We can say that the relationship score (wi,j) is the ratio of 
interactions from employee i to employee j , or the possibility of 
interaction that may occur on employees i and all employees 
next to employee i.  
In this paper, we have attempted this approach by extracting 
information from the real environment, and transformed it into 
the model. This is explained in the next section. 
B. Preparing Relationship Graph
Social Network Analysis requires social network graph. The
social network graph is network of vertices that represent 
people, and edges that represent relationship between those 
people. In order to build a social network for organizational 
analysis in this paper, we used vertices to represent employees, 
edges to represent interaction between employees and called it a 
relationship graph. We could build a relationship graph from 
interactions among employees in an organization. In working 
environment, employees interact to other employees via phone 
call, internal memo, business talking, meeting, email, etc. Those 
interactions imply their relationship.  
In this paper, a relationship graph was created with 
information extracted from an organization’s email log. The 
email log provided email addresses of employees which were 
identified as vertices’ name. The email log also provided sender 
email addresses and recipient email addresses that informed us 
that there was a relationship between the two employees. 
Moreover, an edge between the two employees was used to 
define their relationship. 
Let vi be the vertices of employee i and ei,j = (vi,vj) be the 
directed edge from employee i to j. The relationship graph G = 
(V, E) where V be a set of vertices of n employees and E be the 
set of directed edges is defined as follows: 
G = (V, E) (2) 
V = {vi | i = 1 to n}  (3) 
E = {ei,j=(vi,vj) | i,j =1 to n}  (4) 
Suppose the email address of each employee extracted from 
the email log are Emp1, Emp2, … , Empn then V and E are 
represented as: 
V = {Emp1, Emp2, … Empn} (5) 
E = {(Emp1,Emp2), (Emp1,Emp3), …} (6) 
In the relationship model mentioned in previous section, the 
relationship graph has risk score attributes Ri on each vertex and 
relationship score wi,j on each edge. In order to generate a 
relationship graph, the vertices’ name, edge, and all attributes 
must be transformed into graph data so it can be generated using 
a graph tool such as Pajek or Gephi. In this paper, Pajek was 
chosen as a graph tool for our analysis because it is easy to use 
and it provides common analysis tools such as shortest path 
analysis and shortest path analysis with weight. 
In general, graph data has vertices record set and edge record 
set that are V and E in equation (5) and (6). The vertices record 
set comprises of vertex ids and vertex names. It can also include 
vertex attribute(s) such as sex, age, or score if needed. The edge 
record set comprises of two vertex ids on each line that form an 
edge record. For directed graph, the first vertex id is the start of 
an edge and the second vertex id is the end of an edge. It means 
the first vertex sent email to second vertex if the graph data 
represents relationship of email. Like vertices record set, the 
edge record set can also include attribute(s) such as weight or 
distance if needed. Figure 5 shows an example of vertices record 
set and edge record set, and relationship graph generated from 
these record sets. 
Figure 5.  Sample graph data and its relationship graph 
Once the relationship graph has been generated, the graph 
can then be analyzed using the method explained in the next 
section. 
C. Analysing the Relationship Graph
In this step, the relationship graph from previous section is
analyzed using mathematical methods such as shortest path 
analysis, Markov analysis or Bayesian analysis. This step could help 
us find groups of risky employees and possible attack paths 
on the relationship graph.  
In order to analyze the relationship graph, it is important to find a 
vertex that would be an employee primary attack. As 
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defined in the relationship model, the employee primary attack 
is an employee who has the highest risk score R and the 
employee target attack is an employee who responsible for 
crucial information of the organization.  
By using Pajek, we can scope our analysis from the whole 
relationship graph into a subgraph that consists of only vertices 
and edges containing relationship between the primary and 
target employees. Possible attack paths from one vertex to the 
other can then be found. 
In Figure 6, suppose that the attack path starts at vertex Emp1 
and ends at vertex Emp4. The possible attack paths could be 
Emp1-Emp2-Emp4 or Emp1-Emp3-Emp4 or Emp1-Emp3-
Emp2-Emp4. However, it can be considered that the shorter 
route an attacker can take to get to Emp4 from Emp1, the more 
risk the organization will have. This means that the attack path 
which is the most risky for this organization is the shortest path 
between Emp1 and Emp4, which is Emp1-Emp3-Emp4 or 
Emp1-Emp2-Emp4, in this case.  
Figure 6.  Finding possible attack paths on relationship graph 
Employee with highest risk score might not cause the most 
risk of an organization if there is no path from this employee to 
target employee. In order to determine which employee can 
cause the highest risk to an organization, path lengths of all 
employees to the destination must be compared with one 
another.  
By comparing the lengths of attack paths of the different 
employee primary attacks, it is possible to determine which 
vertex generates the higher or even the highest risk to the whole 
relationship graph. As a result, the organization is able to 
execute proper actions on risky employees differently. 
In any graph or organization, it is likely that more than one 
path of the shortest length can be found. When this occurs, the 
one path with the highest risk can be identified by applying other 
mathematical methods such as shortest path with weight or 
Markov chains. The relationship score (wi,j) on edges can be 
used in this case. In this paper, we are just going to verify the 
proposed approach so we will use shortest path without weight 
method. 
IV. TESTING THE APPROACH
A. Prepare and Calculate the Relationship Graph
In this paper, our relationship model comprises of an
employee primary attack, an employee target attack and other 
employees in between them. Those employees form a social 
network graph with vertices and edges representing relationship 
between them. 
In this study, a social network graph of the organization’s e-
mail activities logs was prepared and formed. Each employee is 
represented by an individual email account and the transmission 
of an email (both sending and receiving) is represented by an 
edge. The log of March 2013 was chosen for the study and 
transformed into graphs data containing information of 8,858 
vertices and 26,404 edges. From this step, a relationship graph 
was generated via Pajek.  
The risk score can be calculated using various information 
related to an employee such as number of spams, number of 
virus detected, or number of emails sent to unauthorized 
accounts outside the organization [22]. The verification of the 
proposed method, in this particular example, is done by 
calculating the risk score from the number of malicious code 
detected on each computer which was extracted from the virus 
protection monthly report on the same period of the email log 
(March 2013). In order to illustrate the proposed approach, this 
paper uses one risk property which is the number of viruses 
found on the computer of employee i. The value Ri can then be 
calculated as follows. 
Ri=
number of virus found on employee i
total number of virus found
(7) 
The value Ri or the risk vector is then assigned to each vertex.
The relationship scores, wi,j were also included into the graph 
data. They were calculated by counting the number of emails 
sent from vi to vj. However, as stated in the previous section that 
shortest path without weight was the method used, the 
relationship scores are included in the relationship graph without 
being used in the analysis phase. This is because we would like 
to illustrate that only the shortest path method can also be used 
for the risk analysis. 
B. Analysis and Discussion
In the studied organization, there were some vertices with
risk scores that were assumed to be employee primary attack 
vertices. By ordering the risk scores of all vertices from highest 
to lowest, it would inform us which employee to be analyzed 
first. Table I shows all vertices that could be employee primary 
attack and employee that would be an employee target attack. 
Please note that emails were changed to preserve confidentiality 
of the studied organization. 
In this study, it was found that the first 4 employees who had 
the highest risk scores were the ones with the vertex IDs “5987”, 
“1141”, “5119” and “7929” in this order Therefore, they were 
assumed to be employee primary attack vertices. Moreover, one 
business director “grs@abc.co.th” (vertex ID: 7000) was chosen 
to be employee target attack due to his responsibility for 
business information of the organization. 
In this study, it was considered that the employee primary 
attack, who had the highest risk vector or Ri and had the shortest 
path length to employee target attack, would generate the most 
risk to the company. The shortest path length or “shortest attack 
path” means the least path length (number of hops) between 
employee primary attack and employee target attack. 
By using Pajek to find “All shortest path between two 
vertices” when the first employee primary attack was “5987” 
and employee primary attack was “7000”, it was found that there 
was no path between them. Therefore, the shortest path length 
was 0. This means that even though the vertices ID “5987” had 
the highest risk score, it does not always mean that there is a path 
to the destination. Therefore, there is no reason to consider the 
employee vertex id “5987” in this particular case. 
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TABLE I.  LIST OF EMPLOYEE PRIMARY AND TARGET ATTACK 






5987 pop@abc.co.th 0.3810 Primary 
1141 cda@abc.co.th 0.2238 Primary 
5119 nun@abc.co.th 0.1048 Primary 
7929 tat@abc.co.th 0.1048 Primary 
6634 suk@abc.co.th 0.0429 Primary 
8615 wya@abc.co.th 0.0381 Primary 
2938 jas@abc.co.th 0.0333 Primary 
6569 sin@abc.co.th 0.0143 Primary 
5379 pda@abc.co.th 0.0095 Primary 
5534 pch@abc.co.th 0.0095 Primary 
8203 uha@abc.co.th 0.0095 Primary 
1049 crn@abc.co.th 0.0048 Primary 
2211 gan@abc.co.th 0.0048 Primary 
5363 pri@abc.co.th 0.0048 Primary 
5859 pen@abc.co.th 0.0048 Primary 
5981 pon@abc.co.th 0.0048 Primary 
7587 sol@abc.co.th 0.0048 Primary 
7000 grs@abc.co.th 0.0000 Target 
Using the same step with second employee primary attack 
whose vertex ID was “1141” and the same target, it was found 
that the shortest path between them was 1. Hence, the shortest 
path length was 1. This means that vertex“1141” had lower risk 
score than the vertex “5987”, but had caused higher risk to the 
organization. This is because the vertex “5987” has no path to 
the target vertex “7000” while the vertex “1141” has path length 
1 (or only one hops) to the target vertex “7000”. 
After all the vertices were processed, the results were 
summarized in Table II, ordered by its length from lowest to 
highest, and its risk ratio from highest to lowest. Please note that 
the vertices with path length of zero were included at the bottom 
because there should not be direct impact to the target from 
them. 
As per the result in TABLE II, the risky employees can be 
classified by path length into three groups. We claim that the 
length of an attack path is more important than employees’ risk 
ratio because it shows how quickly attackers can reach their 
target.  
This way analysts can apply appropriate security policy for 
each of the employees. For example, security policy for the first 
group is to immediately suspend their accounts and let MIS 
officer to clean virus from their computers before reactivating 
their accounts in new name. The second and third groups would 
be the same but would be allowed to use old accounts. However, 
the two employees in the first group who has highest risk ratio 
(VID:1141, 7929) may be interrogated by security committee 
for appropriate actions. 
TABLE II. ANALYSIS RESULT GROUPED BY LENGTH OF SHORTEST 
ATTACK PATH  








1141 cda@abc.co.th 0.2238 7000 grs@abc.co.th 1 
7929 tat@abc.co.th 0.1048 7000 grs@abc.co.th 1 
6569 sin@abc.co.th 0.0143 7000 grs@abc.co.th 1 
8203 uha@abc.co.th 0.0095 7000 grs@abc.co.th 1 
1049 crn@abc.co.th 0.0048 7000 grs@abc.co.th 1 
2211 gan@abc.co.th 0.0048 7000 grs@abc.co.th 1 
5119 nun@abc.co.th 0.1048 7000 grs@abc.co.th 2 
6634 suk@abc.co.th 0.0429 7000 grs@abc.co.th 2 
5363 pri@abc.co.th 0.0048 7000 grs@abc.co.th 2 
8615 wya@abc.co.th 0.0381 7000 grs@abc.co.th 3 
2938 jas@abc.co.th 0.0333 7000 grs@abc.co.th 3 
5379 pda@abc.co.th 0.0095 7000 grs@abc.co.th 3 
5859 pen@abc.co.th 0.0048 7000 grs@abc.co.th 3 
5981 pon@abc.co.th 0.0048 7000 grs@abc.co.th 3 
7587 sol@abc.co.th 0.0048 7000 grs@abc.co.th 3 
5987 pop@abc.co.th 0.3810 7000 grs@abc.co.th 0 
5534 pch@abc.co.th 0.0095 7000 grs@abc.co.th 0 
By following the approach in Figure 2, we created the 
relationship model, relationship graph and analyzed the graph to 
get the results, just like the general approach in Figure 1 can do. 
Only now we can include risk score calculated from user 
behavior into the relationship model and the relationship graph. 
We have found that the relationship graph can be analyzed using 
attack graph analysis as well. This knowledge expand the use of 
attack graph analysis for risk analysis caused by employee as we 
expected. 
V. CONCLUSION
Attacker exploiting vulnerability of people in an 
organization could damage its organization as much as 
vulnerability of computer network systems. However, the 
problem of the current attack graph analysis approach has yet 
focus on people in an organization. It is believed that the attack 
graph analysis approach can also be adapted to analyze attack 
graph of an organization that caused by its people. However, the 
new approach should be able to put user behavior into the 
analysis. In this paper, the proposed approach help us created the 
relationship model, relationship graph and analyzed the graph to 
get the results, just like the general attack graph analysis 
approach. But we can now include attributes about user 
behavior(s) into the relationship model to create the relationship 
graph. The relationship graph generated from this approach 
allow us to apply several mathematical methods not only from 
attack graph analysis, but also from both SNA as well. The 
results which we can classified by its length, help the 
organizational to develop appropriate IT policy and actions to 
handle it specifically. IT security auditor may also use this 
approach as a tool in risk assessment process to help develop risk 
findings and recommendations for risk mitigation for the 
organization as well.  
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However, we considered only risk scores and shortest attack 
path length of the graph. We have not include relationship scores 
in the analysis just to make it less complicated to preliminary 
test the proposed approach. Since it is possible to find more than 
one shortest path between two vertices. Finding shortest path 
using relationship score can help finding exact attack path.  
Since we use shortest path analysis which helps us determine 
the organization risk in some level, it may not enough for 
complex social network containing many attributes. Analyzing 
relationship model with other mathematical methods such as 
Probability Transition Matrix and Markov Chain analysis that 
can handle more attributes with more accurate in its analysis. 
There should be the study to compare mathematical methods 
using this proposed approach. For example, comparing walk 
path using relationship score, Markov Chain and Bayesian 
network. These mathematical methods could help finding more 
accurate attack path. 
Because there are different information sources available in 
organizations. Analyst should carefully select source(s) that 
regularly available and easy to be transformed into graph data. 
Selecting information sources is important when automating the 
process of this approach to quickly calculate organization risk 
on time. We suggest analyst customize process according to the 
organization information sources, management requirements, 
and security policy of the organization. 
REFERENCES 
[1] P. Ammann, D. Wijesekera, and S. Kaushik, “Scalable, Graph-based
Network Vulnerability Analysis,” in Proceedings of the 9th ACM
Conference on Computer and Communications Security, New York,
NY, USA, 2002, pp. 217–224.
[2] R. Dantu, K. Loper, and P. Kolan, “Risk management using behavior
based attack graphs,” in International Conference on Information
Technology: Coding and Computing, 2004. Proceedings. ITCC 2004,
Las Vegas, 2004, vol. 1, pp. 445–449 Vol.1.
[3] S. Jha, O. Sheyner, and J. Wing, “Two formal analyses of attack
graphs,” in 15th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, 2002.
Proceedings, Nova Scotia, Canada, 2002, pp. 49–63.
[4] V. Mehta, C. Bartzis, H. Zhu, E. Clarke, and J. Wing, “Ranking Attack
Graphs,” in Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Recent
Advances in Intrusion Detection, Hamburg, Germany, 2006, pp. 127–
144.
[5] O. Sheyner, J. Haines, S. Jha, R. Lippmann, and J. M. Wing,
“Automated generation and analysis of attack graphs,” in 2002 IEEE
Symposium on Security and Privacy, 2002. Proceedings, 2002, pp. 273–
284.
[6] O. Sheyner and J. Wing, “Tools for Generating and Analyzing Attack
Graphs,” in Proceedings of Formal Methods for Components and
Objects, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Leiden, The Netherlands,
2003, pp. 344–371.
[7] C. Williams, R. Bhaumik, R. Burke, and Mobasher, Bamshad, “The
Impact of Attack Profile Classification on the Robustness of
Collaborative Recommendation,” presented at the Proceedings of the
2006 WebKDD Workshop, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 2006.
[8] C. Phillips and L. P. Swiler, “A graph-based system for network-
vulnerability analysis,” in in Proceedings of the 1998 workshop on New
security paradigms, 1998, pp. 71–79.
[9] P. Zhang, L. Min, L. Hopkins, B. Fardanesh, P. C. Patro, J. Useldinger,
M. Graham, and D. Ramsay, “Utility application experience of
Probabilistic Risk Assessment method,” in Power Systems Conference
and Exposition, 2009. PSCE ’09. IEEE/PES, Seattle, Washington, 2009,
pp. 1–7.
[10] T. W. K. Daniel, H. M.h, LAM S. T, MOK Y. C, OEI W. C, T. K.l, and
Y. X.l, “Education in IT Security: A Case Study in Banking Industry,”
GSTF J. Comput. JoC, vol. 3, no. 3, Aug. 2014.
[11] M. E. J. Newman, “The structure and function of complex networks,”
Soc. Ind. Appl. Math., vol. 45, no. 2, p. 90, Mar. 2003.
[12] O. Sheyner and J. Wing, “Tools for Generating and Analyzing Attack
Graphs,” in Formal Methods for Components and Objects, F. S. de
Boer, M. M. Bonsangue, S. Graf, and W.-P. de Roever, Eds. Springer
Berlin Heidelberg, 2003, pp. 344–371.
[13] C. L. Smith, Probabilistic Risk Assessment Procedures Guide for NASA
Managers and Practitioners. National Information Service, NASA HQ:
CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2012.
[14] B. B. Madan, K. Goševa-Popstojanova, K. Vaidyanathan, and K. S.
Trivedi, “A method for modeling and quantifying the security attributes
of intrusion tolerant systems,” Perform. Eval., vol. 56, no. 1–4, pp.
167–186, Mar. 2004.
[15] J. L. Moreno, Who shall survive? A New Approach to the Problem of
Human Interrelations. Washington, DC: Nervous and Mental Disease
Publishing Company, 1934.
[16] F. Harary, Graph Theory. University of Michigan, IL: Addison-Wesley
Publishing Company, 1969.
[17] M. E. J. Newman, S. Forrest, and J. Balthrop, “Email networks and the
spread of computer viruses,” Phys. Rev. E, vol. 66, no. 3, p. 035101,
Sep. 2002.
[18] H. Ebel, L.-I. Mielsch, and S. Bornholdt, “Scale-free topology of e-mail
networks,” ArXivcond-Mat0201476, Jan. 2002.
[19] J. R. Tyler, D. M. Wilkinson, and B. A. Huberman, “E-Mail as
Spectroscopy: Automated Discovery of Community Structure within
Organizations,” Inf. Soc., vol. 21, no. 2, pp. 143–153, Apr. 2005.
[20] A.-L. Barabasi and R. Albert, “Emergence of scaling in random
networks,” Science, vol. 286, no. 5439, pp. 509–512, Oct. 1999.
[21] X. Ou, W. F. Boyer, and M. A. McQueen, “A Scalable Approach to
Attack Graph Generation,” in Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference
on Computer and Communications Security, New York, NY, USA,
2006, pp. 336–345.
[22] S. Kanchanapokin and S. Boonkrong, “Exploring Bad Behaviors from
Email Logs,” in Information Science and Applications, K. J. Kim, Ed.
Pattaya, Cholburi, Thailand: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2015, pp.
517–524.
Supachai Kanchanapokin is a Ph.D. student of 
Information Technology Department at King 
Mongkut university of Technology, North Bangkok. 
He received his M.Sc. in Information Technology 
from the Department of Computer Engineering at 
Kasetsart University. His research interests are in information 
system security, social network study, IT policy and strategy 
management, and IT auditing.  
Previously, Supachai was an IT professional consultant of 
several international IT consulting firms, providing IT services 
such as system implementation, IT strategy and policy 
development, IT service and operation management. He is now 
senior director of infrastructure and facility management 
division at a national research organization in Thailand. 
Sirapat Boonkrong is an associate professor and an 
associate dean of academic and research affairs at the 
Faculty of Information Technology, King Mongkut’s 
University of Technology North Bangkok 
(KMUTNB), Thailand. He received his B.Sc. and 
Ph.D. in Computer Science from the Department of Computer 
Science at the University of Bath, UK. His main area of 
research is information and network security. 
Previously, Sirapat worked as a researcher at National 
Electronics and Computer Technology Center (NECTEC) in 
Thailand. He also has experience in industry as a project 
manager at an IBM-partnered company. He is currently a full-
time lecturer at the Faculty of Information Technology, 
KMUTNB and is also supervising several Ph.D. students all of 
whom are in the field of information and network security.
Supachai Kanchanapokin and Sirapat Boonkrong 
 | GSTF Journal on Computing (JOC) Vol.5 No.1, August 2016
